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Specific performance-Purchaseof stock.
In a suit against a bank to compel it to register plaintiff as a stockholder for- forty shares of stock, or pay the value of the stock and the
dividends declared thereon as compensation in lieu of the stock, the defendant demurred upon the ground that the plaintiff had a complete remedy at
law. Held, that plaintiff could in equity enforce a specific performance
by having the stock registered in his name and compel the issue of
certificates to him or, in the alternative, if the corporation was unable to
perform its contract, have his remedy by compensation in damages.
SPECIFIC PERFORIMANCE OF CONTRACTS AND THE PURCHASE OFSTOCK.

The subject of the specific performance of contracts to purchase stock possesses an ever increasing interest owing to thegrowth in the number of corporations affording' as these latter
do, through their capital stock, a popular medium of investment. Indeed, corporate stock may alinost be styled a
"commodity," and as it absorbs a large portion of the means
of the community it becomes important to see in what way the
various principles of equity jurisprudence have been applied to
such contracts in cases where the particular relief sought has
been their specific enforcement.
Fir~t, however, as to the form of contracts for the sale of
stock. In England it has been firmly established. since the
Reported in ii So. Rep. 883.
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case of Duneuft v. Albrect, 12 Lim. 189 (1891), that these
contracts are not within the seventeenth section of the Statute
of Frauds. In the United States, on the other hand, whenever that section is in force it has generally been decided that
it governs such contracts. Especially in this case wherever
the words " goods, wares and merchandise" are used. A
good illustration of the general opinion is seen in the case of
Pray v. Mitchell, 6o Me. 430 (1872), which was an action of
assumpsit. The question before the court was whether a
verdict obtained by the plaintiff in an action to recover
damages for the breach of a verbal agreement to transfer to him
stock in a certain joint stock company should stand; and the
decision was that it could not because such a contract was
within the seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds. For
this view the court found strong support in the opinions in
Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9, and in North v. Frost,
15 Conn. 4oo, from which the conclusion was derivable
that there was nothing in the nature of public corporate
stocks which in reason or sound policy ought to exempt
contracts respecting them from those restrictions designed
by the framers of the Act for the prevention of fraud in the
sale of other kinds of personal property.
A similar view has prevailed in the other states: Fine v.
Hornsby, 2 Mo. App. 61 (1876); Boardman v. CItter,
128 Mass. 388 (i88o).
An agreement in relation to the sale of stock which is not
to be performed within the year comes also under the operation of the statute where that particular provision is in f6rce.
Of course, however, when there is an option given, by the
exercise of which the agreement may be performed within
the time, the statute does not apply. See Sedden v. Rosenbaum, 85 Va. 928 (1887).
The question is somewhat of a vexed one and -in some of.
the states it has been practically settled by statutory enactment. Such is the case in those states where capital stock is
declared to be personal property: Rev. Stat., Fla., 1892,
§ 1996; Southern Life Co. v. Cole, 4 Fla. 359.
Coming now to the enforcement of stock contracts it may
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be well to call attention to the fact that, though capital stock
may be an anomalous kind of property, yet contracts of
which it forms the subject-matter are not at all a peculiar
species governed by a set of exceptional equitable piinciples
and for which there exist separate and rigijd rules. Some of
the text writers, -however; notably Fry, seems to make this
very mistake and when they come upon a case wherein the
court has compelled specific performance, as in certain cases
of railway stock, they treat it as an exception to the general
rule. See Tryon Spec. Perf., §§ 24 and 27.
The fact, of course, is that contracts in regard to stock are'
contracts in regard to personalty and has been well said, "a
bill to compel the purchase of stock seeks to secure the
transfer of mere personal property and is subject to and
clothes the suitor with all the disqualifications which attach to
such a proceeding." And see Cutting v. DAna, 25 N. J. Eq.
265 (1874). For breaches of personal contracts the pecuniary damages given at law have generally been approved as
affording sufficient compensation. And though the doctrine
of specific performance usually works out a different result
when applied to a contract for the sale of land the principle in
both cases is the same. That principle is that unless there is
something more involved that the mere breach of a contract
equity will not assume jurisdiction since the remedy at law
for such an injury is full and adequate.
In a leading case upon the subject under consideration
Lord ELDON made the remark, "It is now perfectly well
settled that this court will not enforce specific peiformance of an
agreement for a transfer of stock:" Nutbrower. v. Thornton, 15
Ves. Such a dogmatic statement is misleadihg if not erroneous.
He probably meant by "stock" government and other public
stock, for the term is a generic one in England, having that meaning, the capital stock of private corporations being designated as
"shares;" but even in that case the Lord-Chancellor overlooked
the progressive spirit of equity jurisprudence and its incompatibility'with the laying down in reference to such subject-matter
a rigid and unyielding rule. It is time that such contracts
will not generally appeal successfully to the discretion of the
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chancellor, but the court does not- approach the question in
the spirit indicated by Lord ELDON. Rather, it takes into.
consideration that all such stock is practically alike and easily
obtainable in the market, and requires the plaintiff to show
that his case presents exceptional features, which demand consideration.
As, for example, in the case of Doloret v. Rothschild, I
Lim. & S. 590 (1824), where the court enforced specifically a
contract to purchase certain stock of a foreign government
upon the plaintiffs showing that it was necessary that he
should have the certificates which gave him the legal title.
Unless the circumstances present some such peculiar claim
upon the chancellor's discretion the plaintiff will be obliged
to be satisfied by the pecuniary damages granted by a court
of law. As was said in Eckstein v. Downing,64 N. H. 248
(1887), "we do not hold that specific performance of contracts for the sale of stock or shares in a manufacturing company cannot be decreed under any circumstances but the
plaintiff has not shown, what it is essential he should show,.
that he has no adequate remedy at law.
A few moments consideration will show that there are
likely to be in contracts for the purchase of government or
other public stock in this country but few cases which will
present the required exceptional features, and that in themajority of cases the contract will be practically no more than
a contract in regard to personal property for a breach of which
an adequate remedy at law exists.. So that following the
principle above stated the courts have rarely granted theprayer for a decree that such a contract should be specifically
enforced: Ross v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., i Woolw. 26 (1863)..
STOCK OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

Where the remedy at law is plain, adequate and completecourts of equity will not enforce contracts for the purchase or
transfer of shares of stock in private corporations: Jones v.
Newhall, 115 Mass. 244 (18 ). But such contracts have
much to diffrentiate them from the class just considered. As
was well said by the vice-chancellor in Duncuft v. Albrect-
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"There is no sort of analogy between public stock, as it may
be called, and a certain number of railway shares of a
particular description which are limited in number and which
cannot always be had in the market."
In the United States the capital stock of private corporations is by far more largely the subject of contract than public
stock; and it requires but little thought to see that the
character of the former and the circumstances surrounding
particular. cases much frequently appeal successfully to this
favorable consideration of the chancellor in the matter of
specific performance. A good illustration of this is found in
the case of Treasurer v. Commercial Coal Mining Company,
23 Cal. 391 (1863), which was a suit to compel the defendant
to issue a certificate for forty-six shares of its capital stock
which it had contracted to issue to the plaintiff and others in
return for a nining claim located by them.- It was argued
that a court of equity would not compel the specific performance of such contracts, but the court, while admitting a
general rule to that effect where public stocks were concerned
took a different view of the case at bar. "In the peculiar
condition of business and mining operations in this state
where numerous mining and other corporations are in existence, whose stock is often of fluctuating and uncertain value,
and where certain kinds of stock have a peculiar value to
those acquairited with [the affairs of different companies]
where the market value of stocks, if any they have, is often
difficult to substantiate by competent evidence, and where the
risk of the- personal responsibility of individuals and corporations is so great. Courts should be liberal in extending
the full, adequate and complete relief afforded by a decree of
specific performance." (Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318 18 .)
This is the principle upon which relief was granted in the
case of the famous Pusey Horn and the silver altar-piece of
the Perceys, namely, that the subject-matter possessed a
peculiar and unique value for the plaintiff Sometimes, however, the court makes use of the fact that the subject-matter
is peculiarly valuable to the defendant. This is seen in a case
in which the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract whereby

.

AND THE PURCHASE OF STOCK.

the defendant who had sold her some stock represented by
shares in a certain steamboat agreed in case of a misunderstanding arising between them to take the stock off of her
hands. The misunderstanding when it arose extended even
to the performance of the contract. The court, however,
compelled the defendant to carry out his undertaking on the
ground that were the position reversed, he could have compelled the plaintiff to allow him to repurchase the stock
inasmuch as it was of a peculiar kind which could not be
obtained elsewhere: Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194
(1891).

When the contract relates to the stock of a company not
yet chartered the case has been held to make a special demand
upon the consideration of the court. In Austin and the
North Carolina Railroad Company v. Gillespie. et al., i Jon.
Eq. 261 (1854), the defendants had agreed that, if the plaintiff (Austin) would subscribe unconditionally for certain stock
in a corporation just being organized, they would later take
part of it off of his hands by subscribing for it in their own
names.' The plaintiff carried out his part of the program
but the defendants afterwards refused to relieve him. The
court made a decree for the specific performance of the contract on the ground that this was a case which differed materially
from that of a company already in existence whose stock was
on the market and was represented by a definite 'sum of
money. "Here the company was just struggling into life
and the subscribers for its stock were taking upon themselves
very heavy burdens with a dim prospect of futur advantage
and it would be impossible to give the plaintiff in an action at
law damages at all commensurate with the injury he might
sustain by the failure of the defendants -to perform their
contract."
Where the company, however, after securing its charter,
seeks to compel a subscriber to take the shares he contracted
for the case is different, as there is only one party to the contract: Strasburg Railroad Co. v. Echternacht, 21 Pa. 220
'It is well settled that such contracts are valid and binding: Meyer v.
Blair, io9 N. Y. 6oo (i8 ) ; Morgan v. Struthers, 131 U. S. 246 (1888).
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(953), in some of the states, however, the subscription
contracts have been enforced.
Whenever a trust. is involved in a contract for the sale or
transfer of stock, a court of equity will always compel the
defendant to specifically perform his agreement. As in the
case of Chafee v.- Sprague; i6s R. I. 189 (1886), in which it
was sbught to enforce a contract to transfer certain corporate
stock as collateral security for the performance of the conditions of a trust deed. The court took the position that,
though it was a contract relating to personalty, yet as the
property in question was contracted to a trustee in aid and
enforcement of the provisions of a trust mortgage, they would
assume jurisdiction and enforce the contract specificially:
Dousman v. Wisconsin, L. S. M. & S. R. Co., 40 Wis. 418;
Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (8
); Weaver v. Fisher,
IIo I1l.
146 (1884).
Courts of equity likewise approve strongly of family compromises, and if the transfer of stock is one of the considerations for such a contract, the plaintiff will not dppeal in vain
for relief: Leach v. Forbes, .II Gray, 5o6 (18 ).
So, too, if the defendant is insolvent or not pecuniarily
responsible, so that. practically he cannot respond in damages,
the chancellor in the exercise of his sound discretion may
make the desired decree: Draper v. Stone, 71 Me. 175 (188o);
Avery v. Ryan, 74 Wis. 591 (1889).
Where the defendant puts it out of his power to fulfill his
contract the court may compel him to accept compliance on
the part of -the plaintiff and be liable to him'in damages for
the value of the stock: Burton v. Shotwell, I3 W. Bush,
-271 (877).
Such contracts are, of course, subject to the
general principles of courts of equity, and the exercise of the
high prerogative Under consideration will be denied where the
contract is not equally enforceable against either party as, for
instance, in the case of Danforth v. Phila., M. S. L. Ry. Co., 30
N. J. Eq. 12 (1879), where the court was asked to compel the
defendant to transfer certain stock which it had agreed to
convey in return for services in the building and equipment of
the road. In such a case it would be entirely outside the
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province of a court of equity to compel the plaintiff to perform his contract, and consequently he cannot have such relief'
himself. See 45 N. J. Eq. i22.
Nor will the court lend its aid where the bargain is.
unconscionable or where it is sought to keep the stock afloat
for speculative purposes: Mississippi & Missouri Railroad
Co. v. Cromwell, 91 V. S. 643 (1875).
Nor again will the court interfere where its decree would
be nugatory as is seen in the principal case. There, though
the contract was binding and in other respects enforceable, yet
as decree for specific performance could only have been
inforced by compelling the defendant to issue additional
shares of stock, when in fact it had already issued all that by
law it was allowed to issue, the court declined to do more
than grant the alternative relief prayed for, that is, compensation in damages.
The case of Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434 (1879), is interesting
as showing how carefully the court probes contracts for the
sale of stock when asked to inforce them. In that case the
plaintiff was endeavoring to get control of a majority of the
-stock of a certain national bank. He, with two others, had
borrowed sufficient money and purchased almost the required
number of shares, and the few remaining shares he had contracted for with Foll. Foll refused to fulfill his contract, and
the plaintiff filed his bill for specific performance to compel
him to sell and deliver the shares in question. The court
below made a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill,
but this was reversed on appeal on the ground that it was against
public policy to interfere to place one man in control of an
institution such as a national bank.
The plaintiff might
secure control if he could, but a court of equity would not
help him. The court, Mr.- PAXSON, J., went further, and said
that it knew of no instance in Pennsylvania in which a court
of equity had decreed specific performance of a sale of stock,
and the same statement appears in a later case where the
court enforced specifically the right of a stockholder given by
statute to subscribe to new stock at par: De la Cuesta v.
Insurance Co., 136 Pa. 62, 78 (i89o). But the facts of the
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Pennsylvania cases warrant no stronger proposition than this,
that a court of equity will not enforce specifically a contract
for the sale and purchase of stock where other shares of the
same kind can be bought in the market.
The authorities above cited, when carefully considered, seem
to establish the proposition that the granting or withholding
specific performance of a contract for the purchase of
corporate stock in any given case, while depending indirectly
upon the character of the property involved, is governed by
the answet to'the question whether or not there is an
.adequate and complete remedy afforded by an action at law.
And see Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365 (1879).
This will, of course, depend upon circumstances, but it may be
safely said that if the stock in question has no fixed
marketable value, is not commonly offered for sale, and is
actually rarely sold, a contract for its sale or transfer 'will
generally be specifically enforced. It must not be forgotten,
however, that such relief rests in the sound discretion of the
chancellor, and that general rules on such subjects are apt to
be misleading, for a court of equity will "grant or withhold
relief according to circumstances of each particular case when
general rules will not furnish any exact measure of justice
between the parties." See 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 742.
The reason for Lord ELDON'S dogmatic assertion seems to
have been overlooked. It is that a purchaser of personal
property that has a market never should have the aid of
Chancery to give specific performance, unless there are cir-cumstances such as justify that remedy, and these are that the
.property cannot be bought. The reason for applying the.
remedy in case greatly is this, and the nedessity of being able
to rely on the capacity to get in the title to the particular
property.' It is quite likely that this wise rule "will, like so
many others, be frittered away for want of appreciation of the
true foundation of the rule giving specific performance.
'Without it no one could venture to touch property held merely by
contrdct. Possession which perfects the title to personalty amounts to
.nothing in case of land.

